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Cognitive Control and Psychopathology Lab, Psychological and Brain Sciences, Washington University in St. Louis,
St. Louis, MO, USA
It is unequivocal that a wide variety of incentives can motivate behavior. However, few
studies have explicitly examined whether and how different incentives are integrated in
terms of their motivational influence. The current study examines the combined effects
of monetary and liquid incentives on cognitive processing, and whether appetitive and
aversive incentives have distinct influences. We introduce a novel task paradigm, in which
participants perform cued task-switching for monetary rewards that vary parametrically
across trials, with liquid incentives serving as post-trial performance feedback. Critically,
the symbolic meaning of the liquid was held constant (indicating successful reward
attainment), while liquid valence was blocked. In the first experiment, monetary rewards
combined additively with appetitive liquid feedback to improve subject task performance.
Aversive liquid feedback counteracted monetary reward effects in low monetary reward
trials, particularly in a subset of participants who tended to avoid responding under these
conditions. Self-report motivation ratings predicted behavioral performance above and
beyond experimental effects. A follow-up experiment replicated the predictive power of
motivation ratings even when only appetitive liquids were used, suggesting that ratings
reflect idiosyncratic subjective values of, rather than categorical differences between,
the liquid incentives. Together, the findings indicate an integrative relationship between
primary and secondary incentives and potentially dissociable influences in modulating
motivational value, while informing hypotheses regarding candidate neural mechanisms.
Keywords: reward, motivation, cognitive control, reward integration, decision-making, subjective value, primary
and secondary incentives
INTRODUCTION
On a daily basis, humans are faced with the formidable feat of integrating multiple diverse
incentives to pursue behavioral goals. However, while most extant studies of reward support the
powerful role for motivational incentives in driving cognitive processing and behavior (Atkinson,
1964; Bolles, 1975; McClelland, 1987;Weiner, 1989), they rarely account for (and often ignore) how
different categories of incentives motivate behavior. This is particularly true in human cognitive
experiments that examine incentive effects on task performance (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999;
Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002). These studies traditionally use monetary rewards as incentives, and
“motivation” is often defined as the behavioral differences between high and low monetary reward
conditions (e.g., a participant who responds faster and more accurately during conditions with
greater monetary rewards is assumed to be more “motivated”). As such, the well-controlled
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laboratory studies examining monetary incentives effects on
task performance tend to have a more limited view of
motivation, and do not capture variation from the wide array
of motivational influences that regularly drive human behavior.
This is problematic as these studies may fail to capture the
complexity of motivational processing that occurs in real world
decision-making.
Studies that solely use monetary incentives (a secondary
reward) to measure the impact of motivational incentives on task
behavior neglect the role of primary incentives (e.g., food and
sex) that may be more “hard-wired” in their influence on human
behavior (Krug and Braver, 2014). More importantly, humans
appear to seamlessly “bundle” different categories of incentives
to influence behavioral decisions (e.g., deciding whether to spend
$100 to treat a visiting friend to a fancy a steak dinner or finally
take care of that overdue dental cleaning). While the idea of
a computing a subjective value for bundled incentives is not
new (Rangel et al., 2008; FitzGerald et al., 2009; Padoa-Schioppa
and Cai, 2011), it is less evident how to measure how this
“value computation” explicitly biases cognition and behavior. For
instance, imagine an individual who works for a company that
provides delicious snacks in a break room for all of their workers.
This individual may be driven to perform well in order to earn
their paycheck, but also by the snacks, which together enhance
the value of working at that particular company. In this scenario,
this worker’s motivation may depend on a combination of both
the salary (secondary) and available snacks at the office (primary),
but it is difficult to estimate the specific contribution of each
incentive to their overall motivation to work at that job.
To further complicate things, incentives can either provide
a purely symbolic or a value-dependent motivational effect on
goal-directed behavior (McClelland, 1987). A purely symbolic
incentive will indicate the relative importance of a particular
trial and/or condition, which can help modulate cognitive
processing during a task. In this scenario, positive and negative
incentives are equally informative, as both provide clear signals
of task performance. Conversely, a value-dependent motivational
incentive will both signal the importance and influence the
subjective value of the task goal; accordingly, it should modulate
behavioral task performance in proportion to that subjective
value. Specifically, a participant’s task performance will be
contingent on whether a positive (i.e., appetitive) or negative
(i.e., aversive) incentive is used, and moreover, how strongly
they subjectively value that incentive. Monetary reward is a well-
known motivational incentive, as individuals expend more effort
and utilize more cognitive resources to perform better on tasks
with monetary reward (Knutson et al., 2000; Small et al., 2005;
Engelmann et al., 2009; Hübner and Schlösser, 2010). However,
it remains highly disputed whether non-monetary incentives
have similar or distinct motivational effects on cognitive task
performance (Krug and Braver, 2014).
Two distinct theories have emerged that putatively explain
how primary and secondary rewards combine to modulate
cognitive processing and behavior. One possibility is that primary
and secondary rewards are integrated in terms of their behavioral
influence, but modulate decision-making via separate parallel
neural mechanisms. Some fMRI neuroimaging evidence suggests
that primary and secondary rewards produce similar behavioral
changes in a working memory task, albeit through distinct neural
mechanisms of reinforcement (Beck et al., 2010). Moreover,
a meta-analysis of human functional neuroimaging studies by
Sescousse et al. (2013) revealed that different categories of
incentives were represented more strongly in distinct brain
structures within the reward network (e.g., money elicits the
orbitofrontal cortex, while foods elicit the anterior insula).
Notably, this insula activity may relate to the interoceptive
effects of primary incentives, which is not present with abstract
secondary incentives. Conversely, some researchers argue that
the subjective values of primary and secondary rewards are
initially combined into a “common currency” which is then used
to bias subsequent decisions (McNamara and Houston, 1986;
Levy and Glimcher, 2012). This view has been bolstered by
fMRI studies that illustrate that ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) are activated during
economic choices about food and monetary rewards (O’Doherty,
2007; Chib et al., 2009), as well as in anticipation of juice
and monetary rewards (Kim et al., 2011). Critically, these latter
studies suggest that individuals may process expected rewards
without regard to category of incentive.
A related question is how humans combine appetitive and
aversive incentives to modulate behavior. Studies have shown
that when individuals made economic decisions about combined
monetary rewards and painful shock stimulations, the subjective
expected utility of the integrated incentives was correlated with
neural activity in vmPFC and other value-sensitive brain regions,
including ventral striatum (VS) and anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC; Talmi et al., 2009; Park et al., 2011). Notably, the these
brain regions are thought to be involved with integrating action
costs and benefits of a decision (Botvinick et al., 2004; Croxson
et al., 2009; Fujiwara et al., 2009; Shenhav et al., 2013). These
studies provide evidence that humans may encode the values
of diverse incentives with conflicting valence, and that this
motivational conflict is not restricted to incentives of the same
type. However, a limitation of these prior studies is that most have
measured incentive integration in terms of preference decisions,
rather than in terms of the effects of incentives in motivating
goal-directed behavior (e.g., how much does an incentive impact
task performance, which is more similar to real-world scenarios).
To fully capture the effects of incentives on goal-directed tasks,
it is necessary to empirically measure how combined primary
and secondary incentives translate into quantifiable changes in
cognition and behavior.
To investigate these questions, we developed a novel
experimental paradigm that examines the effects of monetary
and liquid incentives on goal-directed behavior, via a classic task
of cognitive control: the cued task-switching paradigm. While
task-switching per se is not the primary focus of the study,
we use this paradigm since it is considered to be a hallmark
task of cognitive control (Monsell and Driver, 2000) in that
successful task performance relies upon the flexible maintenance
and updating of multiple task-rules in working memory to select
the appropriate action to successfully perform the task. In this
paradigm, each trial begins with a cue to indicate which task
to perform on that trial, either a letter judgment (vowel vs.
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consonant classification) or a number judgment (odd vs. even
classification). The cued task varies randomly from trial to trial;
because the target stimulus is always ambiguous (a letter-number
pair), so cognitive control is required to disambiguate the target,
based on the relevant task goal for that trial. As such, the task was
relatively demanding, and participants would only successfully
perform the task if they were motivated enough. Monetary
incentives were used as a means of manipulating motivation in
a symbolic manner. The monetary reward varied on a trial-by-
trial basis, and was indicated with dollar sign symbols presented
simultaneously with the task cues ($, $$, or $$$$; denoting that
the trial had low, medium or high reward value, respectively).
Reward was earned on a trial when participants performed both
fast and accurately.
The key novel component is that when participants earned
the monetary reward available on a trial, this successful reward
attainment was signaled via a drop of either appetitive (juice),
neutral (a tasteless neutral solution, or aversive (concentrated
saltwater) liquid delivered directly to their mouth. Critically,
since the liquid feedback only served as an informational signal
about performance success in each trial, the symbolic utility
of the liquid was conveyed solely by its (presence vs. absence,
which indicated a failure to attain the monetary reward). We
emphasized the symbolic utility of the liquid by manipulating
liquid valence across blocks (rather than on a trial-by-trial basis),
and only incidentally mentioning that the liquid might vary
in this manner, rather than by explicitly calling attention to
the manipulation (e.g., via trial-by-trial cueing, which could
emphasize the different symbolic or categorical properties of the
different liquids). Because of the subtle and unobtrusive nature
of the liquid manipulation, we might predict that individuals
would perform similarly across all task blocks regardless of
the type of liquid they receive as feedback. Alternatively, if
the liquid valence (positive, neutral, negative) does influence
task performance under these conditions, it would demonstrate
that individuals incidentally integrate the subjective motivational
value of the liquid with the monetary incentive to affect behavior.
The latter result would have important theoretical implications
for how individuals combine multiple categories of incentives to
modulate the cognitive processing in the pursuit of behavioral
goals.
In the current study, we addressed three scientific questions.
First, we explored whether and how primary and secondary
rewards are integrated to modulate motivational and cognitive
processes. If humans process primary and secondary reward
mainly in terms of symbolic value, then the type of liquid given
as feedback should not influence task performance. Alternatively,
individuals may incorporate the subjective motivational value
of the liquid feedback with monetary reward, modulating task
performance accordingly. In such a case, we might predict
that the appetitive value of the liquid combines additively with
monetary reward value in terms of its influence on cognitive
processing and task performance. While the latter result may
be surprising, given the symbolic role of the liquid incentives, it
would suggest that humans automatically integrate the monetary
and liquid rewards into a “common currency” utility component
that biases goal-directed behavior.
Second, we tested whether appetitive and aversive
motivational incentives have distinct impacts on cognitive
processing. If appetitive and aversive liquids were processed via
the same cognitivemechanism, we should observe additive effects
of both liquid types on task performance (i.e., with the appetitive
liquid increasing the monetary reward value and aversive liquid
reducing the monetary reward value). Alternatively, different
liquid valences may have distinct motivational effects on task
performance (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In this case, we
would still predict an additive effect of two appetitive incentives
(e.g., juice and money) on task performance. However, if aversive
incentives combine with appetitive incentives via a separate
mechanism (i.e., one that is responsible for integrating benefits
with costs), this integration could result in either a net positive or
net negative motivational value. In such a case, we might expect
an interactive effect of the two incentive types (e.g., saltwater and
money), in which the aversive liquid has a particularly strong
deleterious impact on performance in trials with low monetary
reward, signifying when motivational value becomes negative. In
other words, the presence of an interactive, rather than additive,
effect of saltwater on task performance would provide evidence
for separate mechanisms responsible for aversive vs. appetitive
motivational integration.
Third, we sought to provide convergent evidence that the
reward manipulations utilized in this study produced value-
dependent motivational effects that were highly subjective (i.e.,
idiosyncratic) in nature. Toward this end, we also used self-
report ratings to assess participant motivation in each of the
task conditions. In order to provide stronger support for the
utility of self-reported motivational ratings, we also conducted a
second experiment with the same task paradigm, but including
only different appetitive liquid rewards (e.g., three juices), in
conjunction withmonetary incentives. By eliminating categorical
differences across the liquids, we directly tested whether task
performance reflected the subjective motivational value of
the liquid incentives (as measured by self-report motivational
ratings), rather than their categorical or symbolic properties.
EXPERIMENT 1: HOW DO APPETITIVE
AND AVERSIVE LIQUID INCENTIVES
INFLUENCE MOTIVATION TO ATTAIN
MONETARY INCENTIVES?
Materials and Methods
Participants
Forty-two adults (27 females; ages 18–32; M = 20.3; SD =
2.4) were recruited from the Washington University Psychology
Department Experimetrix Subject Pool. The study was carried
out in accordance with the recommendations of the Institutional
Review Board of the Human Research Protection Office at
Washington University, St. Louis. All participants provided
written informed consent, and were given a payment for their
participation ($20 for a 2-h session), with additional earnings
based on performance up to seven dollars (M = $4.80, SD =
$0.93). Three participants were excluded from analyses due to
experimental and/or technical error (N = 39; 27 females, ages
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 2037
Yee et al. Humans Integrate Monetary and Liquid Incentives
18–32, M = 20.3 SD = 2.5). Data were collected and managed
using a secure web-based application, Research Electronic Data
Capture (REDCap), hosted at Washington University (Harris
et al., 2009).
Task
Subjects performed a computerized letter-digit task-switching
paradigm (see Figure 1) programmed in E-Prime Version
2.0.10.242 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh PA;
www.pstnet.com). Each trial began with a fixation cross for
200ms, followed by brief fixation flicker for 100ms to signal the
upcoming cue. Next, a cue was presented for 500ms to indicate
which task to perform on that trial. If the cue text was “Attend
Letter,” the task would be to classify a letter as a vowel or a
consonant, whereas if it was “Attend Number,” the task would be
to classify a number as odd or even. The number of dollar signs
displayed above and below the cue indicated the reward value
of the trial during the incentive runs (See Procedure). Following
a cue-to-target interval blank screen of 1850ms, the target
stimulus was presented for up to 2000ms, which consisted of a
letter and a digit displayed in the center of the screen. Since every
target stimulus contained both a letter and number, cognitive
control is recruited to appropriately update the relevant task
goal for that trial. Subject responses were recorded using an
E-prime SR box, and response mappings were counterbalanced
between participants. After the target was removed, a fixation
cross appeared on the screen for 1000ms, followed by feedback.
During practice sessions, participants received written verbal
feedback that was visually presented on the screen to indicate
whether the trial was correct, incorrect or too slow. In baseline
and incentive conditions, participants no longer received visual
feedback on their performance, but simply saw the text “Next
Trial Coming Up” for 2000ms after each completed trial. In the
incentive condition, participants received a squirt of liquid as
feedback if they were accurate and were faster than the reward
criterion that was calculated after the baseline session (37.5th
percentile of correct RTs from task-switching blocks). Following
the feedback, a fixation cross was presented until the start of the
next trial.
Procedure
Participants performed three practice runs of the letter-digit task-
switching paradigm. First, they practiced the letter task or digit
task (12 trials each run, order was counterbalanced), in which
they only saw the same written task cue for the entire run.
Afterwards, they practiced task-switching, in which both “Attend
Letter” and “Attend Number” task cues were intermixed during
the run (24 trials). During practice runs, participants received
performance feedback after each trial. The experimenter was
available to answer questions and ensure that the participant
understood the task.
Next, participants performed three longer baseline runs.
During baseline runs, participants performed the same letter-
digit task but received no performance feedback. First, they
performed two single-task baseline runs (letter only or digit only,
48 trials in each block), followed by a task-switching baseline
run consisting of 96 trials. Subjects were instructed to respond as
FIGURE 1 | Letter-digit task-switching paradigm. Each trial began with a
fixation cross, followed by a cue that indicated the categorization rule (e.g.,
“Attend Number” vs. “Attend Letter”) and the reward value of the trial, when
relevant (e.g., $, $$, or $$$$). During practice and baseline trials, participants
were told that the dollar signs had no importance. The target was presented
after 1850ms, which consisted of a letter and a digit displayed at the center of
the screen. Participants made either a vowel/consonant or odd/even judgment
depending on the cue instruction. During incentive runs, participants received
2mL of liquid (juice, neutral, or saltwater) as feedback if they were accurate
and faster than their reward criterion (determined from baseline performance.
Liquids were blocked across runs and counterbalanced. Following the
feedback (if applicable), a fixation cross was presented until the start of the
next trial.
quickly and accurately as possible. Participants performed with
an average response time of 806ms (SD = 190ms) and with
90% accuracy (SD = 0.12) in the task-switching baseline blocks,
suggesting both that the task was indeed challenging, but also
that participants could perform it with a high-level of proficiency.
Although dollar signs symbols were always presented with the
task cues, in the baseline conditions participants were told that
they did not hold any significance.
Afterwards, the participant performed three runs of letter-
digit task-switching in the incentive condition. Participants were
informed that they could earn monetary reward in that trial if
they responded accurately and faster than a reward criterion.
The reward criterion was calculated for each participant, based
on the 37.5th percentile of correct reaction times (RT) during
the task-switching baseline run. This reward criterion was set to
make the incentive blocks challenging, such that the participants
would have to substantially improve their performance relative
to baseline (i.e., maintaining accuracy while increasing speed),
in order to earn rewards on the majority of trials during the
incentive runs.
If the participant was both accurate and faster than their
reward criterion, they received a squirt of liquid as feedback to
indicate that they had earned the monetary reward for that trial.
Conversely, if they did not earn the monetary reward, they did
not receive any liquid feedback, which indicated that they did
not have the performance level necessary to receive the monetary
reward. The number of dollar signs presented with the cue
indicated how much money the participant could earn per trial
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(“$” = low, “$$” = medium, “$$$$” = high). While participants
were not told the exact dollar amount per trial (to minimize
the likelihood that they would try to maintain a running count
of earned monetary reward), they understood that the dollar
signs indicated the relative worth of each trial type. They could
earn up to seven dollars in addition to their hourly payment,
which they would receive at the end of the experiment. Reward
cues and letter-digit presentation order were randomized and
counterbalanced across subjects.
The incentive condition consisted of three runs, with each
run containing two blocks of 48 trials (six blocks total) Each
run had a different feedback liquid (apple juice, an isotonic
tasteless neural solution, and concentrated saltwater), with liquid
order counterbalanced between subjects. Liquid was delivered
via a digital infusion pump (model SP210iw, World Precision
Instruments, Inc.) and Tygon tubing directly to the participant’s
mouth. The liquid pump was triggered by an output signal from
the E-Prime script that delivered 2mL of liquid as feedback
if participants earned the monetary reward (i.e., both accurate
and faster than the reward criterion). Participants knew that
the liquids changed across runs, but this manipulation was not
explicitly emphasized in the instructions (i.e., liquid identity was
treated as an incidental factor).
Participants filled out various self-report questionnaires upon
completing the letter-digit task-switching paradigm. They rated
how much they liked the three liquids, as well as how intense
they were, on a 7-point Likert Scale. They also rated their
motivation, performance, and how much they liked performing
the low reward, medium reward, and high reward trials in each
of the three liquid conditions on a 7-point scale. Following
completion of the questionnaires, participants were informed of
their additional earnings, paid, and debriefed.
Results1
Incentive Effects on Reward Rate
We first examined the effect of monetary and liquid incentives on
task performance, which we quantified in terms of reward rate.
Reward rate was defined as the percentage of rewarded trials in
each condition of the experiment (when the subject was accurate
and faster than the reward criterion). Critically, participants
needed to significantly improve their task performance in order
to have a high reward rate in the incentive trials; so enhanced
performance reflects increased “motivation” during the incentive
blocks. With a 3 × 3 repeated measures omnibus ANOVA,
we observed significant effects of monetary reward [F(2, 76) =
28.095, p < 0.001] and liquid feedback [F(2, 76) = 20.102,
p < 0.001], as well as a significant interaction [F(4, 152) = 4.868,
p = 0.001]. See Table 1 for reference. We next decomposed this
omnibus pattern, in order to better understand the nature of the
observed effects.
Monetary Incentives Improve Reward Rate
To examine the “pure” effects of monetary reward, we first
examined data from the neutral liquid condition only. A 3 × 1
repeated measures ANOVA tested the effect of monetary reward
on reward rate. We observed a monotonic effect of monetary
reward, in which increased reward rates were attained with
increasing amounts of monetary reward, which was signaled by
receiving the neutral solution as feedback [F(2, 76) = 7.547, p =
0.001].
Liquid Feedback Also Modulates Reward Rate
Next, we examined whether the type of liquid used as feedback
provided additional motivational effects on reward rate beyond
monetary incentive effects. We separately compared reward rate
effects between juice and neutral solution conditions, as well
as between saltwater and neutral solution conditions, in order
1Relevant material for this paper can be accessed via Open Science Framework
at https://osf.io/ajgp3/. This repository contains the raw data for Experiments 1
and 2 as well as a summary document detailing all of the analyses conducted by
D.M.Y. for the manuscript, using the R statistical language, and summarized via
R Markdown. This document should provide the code needed to reproduce the
relevant results contained within the manuscript for each experiment. Please note
that this material has not been peer-reviewed.
TABLE 1 | Reward Rate, Error Rates, and Response Times (Experiment 1).
L
iq
u
id
fe
e
d
b
a
c
k
Monetary reward
Low ($) Medium ($$) High ($$$$)
Juice Reward rate 0.733 (0.107) 0.741 (0.116) 0.777 (0.116)
Response time 574 (60) 570 (57) 543 (52)
Error rate 0.146 (0.076) 0.149 (0.074) 0.135 (0.072)
Neutral Reward rate 0.672 (0.112) 0.679 (0.095) 0.739 (0.091)
Response time 600 (61) 596 (61) 560 (59)
Error rate 0.158 (0.062) 0.151 (0.079) 0.151 (0.076)
Saltwater Reward rate 0.526 (0.211) 0.575 (0.124) 0.704 (0.133)
Response time 670 (12) 660 (97) 599 (92)
Error rate 0.199 (0.099) 0.183 (0.064) 0.148 (0.066)
Table of reward rates, response times, and error rates by experimental condition (three levels of monetary reward and three types of liquid feedback). The mean score per experimental
category is listed, with standard deviation in parentheses. Reward rate is the percentage of incentive trials for which monetary incentive was received. Subjects received a monetary
reward during a trial if they were both accurate and faster than a reward criterion, which was established based on performance from the mixed baseline run. Response time includes
only correctly responded trials, in milliseconds. Error rate is the percentage of commission errors (i.e., excluding no response trials).
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FIGURE 2 | Reward rate bar plot. The bar plot indicates reward rate performance as a function of experimental condition (three levels of monetary reward, and
three types of liquid feedback). The top figure includes all 39 subjects in the analysis. This figure highlights the significant main effects of monetary reward, liquid
valence, and the interaction of the two factors when contrasting neutral and saltwater conditions. The data were further divided into two subgroups. In the No
Response subgroup (below right), the interaction pattern was even more strongly present, while in the Regular Response subgroup (below left), the interaction was
absent, though there was still a (trend-level) effect of saltwater on reward rate.
to better isolate appetitive and aversive liquid valence effects.
The reward rates across all monetary and liquid conditions are
illustrated in Figure 2.
Juice vs. Neutral
Participants performed better with juice than with neutral
solution as liquid feedback. A 3 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA
showed a main effect of liquid type [F(1, 38) = 9.660, p =
0.004], with an average reward rate of 75% in the juice
blocks, compared to 70% in the neutral blocks. The ANOVA
also confirmed that the main effect of monetary reward was
still present when combining both liquid types [F (2, 76) =
11.288, p < 0.001]. Importantly, there was no hint of
an interaction between the two factors [F (2, 76) = 0.463,
p = 0.631], indicating that their effects on reward rate were
additive.
Saltwater vs. Neutral
Participants had lower reward rates with saltwater than with
neutral solution as liquid feedback. A 3 × 2 repeated measures
ANOVA demonstrated a main effect of liquid type [F(1, 38) =
15.271, p < 0.001], with an average reward rate of 60% in the
saltwater blocks, compared to the 70% in the neutral blocks. The
main effect of monetary reward was still present, with higher
reward rates for greater monetary reward [F(2, 76) = 25.222,
p < 0.001]. Notably, there was a significant interaction between
the monetary reward and liquid factors [F(2, 76) = 4.864, p =
0.010]. Post hoc analyses revealed that the saltwatermost strongly
impacted reward rate in trials with lowmonetary reward. Subjects
performed worse with saltwater feedback on trials with low and
medium monetary reward [t(38) = 3.570, p < 0.001; t(38) =
3.830, p < 0.001], but not during trials with maximummonetary
reward [t(38) = 1.383, p = 0.175].
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When we further examined the individual subject patterns
in the data, we discovered that a subset of the subjects actually
withheld some of their responses during low reward trials in the
saltwater condition. We performed a more focused analysis to
determine whether these intentional “no responses” contributed
to the observed interactive pattern between saltwater and neutral
solution liquid feedback.
No Response Subgroup
While most of the 39 participants responded on every task
trial, a subset of nine participants withheld responses from at
least three trials, exclusively during the low reward trials of the
saltwater condition, with a range from 7 to 62 “no responses.”
We categorized these nine participants as our “No Response”
(NR) subgroup. We ran a 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on reward rate
with monetary reward, liquid type, and group as factors. We
observed significant effects of monetary reward and liquid type
[F(2, 74) = 31.825, p < 0.001; F(1, 37) = 28.252, p < 0.001], and
a trend-level effect of response subgroup [F(1, 37) = 2.964, p =
0.093]. Moreover, there were significant two-way interactions
between subgroup and liquid type [F(2, 74) = 33.302, p < 0.001],
and between subgroup and monetary reward [F(1, 38) = 10.949,
p < 0.001]. Most critically, we observed a significant three-way
interaction between subgroup, liquid feedback, and monetary
reward [F(2, 74) = 7.686, p < 0.001].
Based on these findings, we analyzed the “Regular Response”
subgroup separately to test whether it was the presence of the NR
subgroup that drove the Two-way interaction observed in the full
dataset. When we omitted the NR subjects from our analyses,
we still observed an effect of monetary reward [F(2, 58) =
16.530, p < 0.001], and a marginally significant effect of liquid
feedback [F(1, 29) = 3.658, p = 0.066]. Critically, the interaction
between monetary reward and liquid feedback was no longer
even close to significant [F(2, 58) = 1.052, p = 0.356]. However,
even in this “Regular Response” subgroup, better performance in
the saltwater condition was observed on higher monetary reward
trials (MH = 0.720, SDH = 0.085) compared to low and medium
monetary reward trials (MM = 0.617, SDM = 0.095;ML = 0.618,
SDL = 0.024).
These results reveal that the interactive pattern between
the monetary reward and aversive liquid incentive (saltwater)
observed in the full dataset was primarily driven by the “No
Response” subgroup. One possibility is that these NR subjects
may have been particularly sensitive to saltwater, which may
have biased them to withhold responding to eliminate the risk
of receiving saltwater altogether in low monetary reward trials.
While the “Regular Response” subgroup did not exhibit as an
extreme of a response as the NR subjects in the saltwater
condition, theymay have also been less motivated by the prospect
of earning a monetary reward in the low-reward saltwater trials,
but enough to consistently overcome the aversive taste of the
saltwater feedback during these trials. The reward rates divided
by subgroup are illustrated in Figure 2.
Response Times
To better understand the motivational effects of the liquid
feedback on reward rate, we analyzed participant response
times (RT) on correctly responded trials. We first compared
RTs between juice (appetitive) and neutral solution conditions,
and then between saltwater (aversive) and neutral solution
conditions. The RTs are listed in Table 1.
Juice vs. Neutral
Both the juice and monetary rewards provided positive
motivational effects on participant RT. We ran a 3 × 2 repeated
measures ANOVA to examine the effects of monetary reward
and juice on RT. Participants were faster when receiving juice
as liquid feedback, with an average RT of 562ms, compared to
585ms with neutral solution [F(1, 38) = 6.297, p = 0.016].
Participants were also faster on trials where they could earn more
money [F(2, 76) = 22.789, p < 0.001]. There was no significant
interaction [F(2, 76) = 0.600, p = 0.552].
Saltwater vs. Neutral
The saltwater provided a negative motivational effect on
participant RT. We ran a 3 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA
to examine the effects of monetary reward and aversive liquid
(saltwater) on RT. Participants responded slower when receiving
saltwater as liquid feedback, with an average RT of 639ms,
compared to 585ms with neutral solution [F(1, 38) = 8.309, p =
0.006]. However, participants were still faster on trials where they
could earnmoremoney [F(2, 76) = 16.910, p < 0.001]. There was
no significant interaction [F(2, 76) = 0.839, p = 0.436].
Error Rates
Error rates were defined strictly in terms of commission errors
(i.e., excluding no response trials from the analysis). We first
compared error rates between juice (appetitive) and neutral
solution conditions, and second between saltwater (aversive) and
neutral solution conditions. The error rates are listed in Table 1.
Juice vs. Neutral
Participants did not differ significantly in error rates between
juice and neutral solution liquid feedback conditions. A 3 × 2
repeated measures ANOVA on error rate with monetary reward
and liquid feedback as factors, and indicated similar error rates
across the two liquid conditions [F(1, 38) = 0.703, p = 0.401], as
well as across different amounts of monetary reward [F(2, 76) =
0.500, p = 0.609]. There was no significant interaction [F(2, 76) =
0.204, p = 0.816].
Saltwater vs. Neutral
Conversely, the saltwater incentive was found to modulate error
rates. We ran a 3 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA to examine
the effects of monetary reward and liquid feedback on participant
error rate. Participants committed more errors on trials in which
they could earn less monetary reward [F(2, 76) = 3.644, p =
0.031]. Additionally, there was a marginally significantly liquid
effect, with an average error rate of 18% on saltwater blocks,
compared to 15% with neutral solution blocks [F(1, 38) =
3.322, p = 0.076]. There was no significant interaction [F(2, 76) =
2.365, p = 0.101].
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Switch Costs
Since switch costs are typically treated as an index of cognitive
control, we examined RT switch costs (i.e., subtracting task-
repeat trial RTs from task-switch trial RTs) as a specificmeasure of
monetary and liquid effects on cognitive processing.We observed
a small, but significant, switch cost when we collapsed all task
conditions within each subject (M = 25ms, t(38) = 5.685, p <
0.001). The small magnitude of the switch cost, while significant,
is unsurprising as participants were given a long cue-to-target
interval to prepare for the task: such long intervals are associated
reduced switch costs (Meiran, 1996; Rubin and Meiran, 2005),
and thus decrease the sensitivity of this index as an indicator of
cognitive control demand.
Next, we tested whether RT switch costs were significantly
modulated by monetary reward and liquid incentives. These
analyses were conducted using the lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al.,
2015) and LME4 (Bates et al., 2015) packages in the R statistical
language. We ran a linear mixed-effects model on RT switch
costs with subject as a random factor, and liquid type and
monetary reward as fixed factors. We dummy coded the liquids
(saltwater= − 1, neutral solution= 0, juice= 1) and monetary
reward ($ = −1, $$ = 0, $$$$ = 1). We used the standard
step-up model building approach and selected the linear mixed
model with minimum Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
and Bayesian information criterion (BIC; West et al., 2015).
Consistent with prior work examining incentive effects on task-
switching (Aarts et al., 2010; Kleinsorge and Rinkenauer, 2012),
the mean RT switch cost was lowest when monetary reward was
highest [$: M1 = 28ms, SD1 = 88ms; $$: M2 = 39ms, SD2 =
86ms; $$$$: M4 = 11ms, SD4 = 72ms]. However, there was no
main effect of liquid on switch costs or any interaction. Although
the null effect of liquid on switch costs is somewhat surprising,
given the effect of this variable on reward rate, the overall the
small magnitude of the switch cost to begin with suggests that
we may have had reduced sensitivity to detect such effects.
Self Report Ratings Predict Unique Variance in
Reward Rate
We conducted a hierarchical multiple regression to determine
whether self-report ratings had additional predictive utility on
reward rate beyond the effects of liquid type and money reward.
These analyses were conducted using the lmerTest (Kuznetsova
et al., 2015) and LME4 (Bates et al., 2015) packages in the R
statistical language. Mathematically, this is represented as a linear
mixed model with the reward rate predicted by the monetary
reward m and the liquid feedback l (Equation 1). The betas
represent the weights for money, liquid, and the interaction, from
left to right. Dummy coding was used to label the three liquids
(juice = 1, neutral solution = 0, saltwater = −1) and amount
of monetary reward ($ = −1, $$ = 0, $$$$ = 1). A mixed level
regression analysis was conducted, with liquid type andmonetary
reward as fixed effects, while treating subject as a random effect,
and included correlated intercepts and slopes for the fixed factors
(Barr et al., 2013; Magezi, 2015). Model selection was determined
by step-up model building approach and choosing the model
with the lowest AIC and BIC criterion (West et al., 2015). We
observed significant effects of monetary and liquid rewards, as
well a significant interaction, which confirmed our previous
results.
Reward Rate = βm m+ βl l+ βml ml (1)
Next, we mean-centered the self-report liking ratings (e.g., How
much did you like the $ trial with juice?) and motivation ratings
(e.g., How motivated were you on a $ trial with juice?), by
each subject. Reward rate performance was independently and
significantly predicted by liking ratings [F(1, 38) = 38.706, p <
0.001], as well as by motivation ratings [F(1, 38) = 55.892, p <
0.001]. Adding liking ratings to the model (Equation 2) predicted
additional variance in the reward rate [χ2
(1)
= 11.846, p < 0.001].
Furthermore, adding motivation ratings significantly improved
the model (Equation 3), but the liking ratings were no longer
a significant factor in predicting reward rate variance [χ2
(1)
=
11.986, p < 0.001]. Interestingly, when we reversed the order and
added motivation ratings before the liking ratings, motivation
ratings enhanced the model [χ2
(1)
= 23.374, p < 0.001], but
adding liking ratings in addition to motivation ratings did not
predict any additional variance [χ2
(1)
= 0.458, p = 0.499].
These regression patterns suggest that the variance in the reward
rates explained by liking is shared with motivation, but that the
motivation ratings predict additional unique variance in reward
rate (See Table 2).
Reward Rate = βm m+ βl l+ βml ml+ βlikelike (2)
Reward Rate = βm m+ βl l+ βml ml+ βlikelike
+ βmotmotive (3)
TABLE 2 | Hierarchical linear regression of self-report ratings on reward
rate.
Variable β t AIC BIC
Step 1 −418.8 -360.9
Money 0.0479*** 5.985
Liquid 0.0744*** 5.315
Money × Liquid −0.033** −3.170
Step 2 −428.7 −366.9
Money 0.0422*** 4.930
Liquid 0.0350* 2.127
Money × Liquid −0.033** −3.091
Like 0.0218*** 3.656
Step 3 −438.7 −373.1
Money 0.0291** 3.217
Liquid 0.0332* 2.249
Money × Liquid −0.0269* −2.518
Like 0.0050 0.681
Motivation 0.0289*** 3.987
Results of a three-step hierarchical regression are presented, which tested whether the
self-report motivation and liking ratings held predictive utility above and beyond the
experimental task conditions. A mixed linear model was employed, using the lmerTest
and LME4 packages in the R statistical language, with reward rate predicted by monetary
reward (money) and liquid feedback (liquid) in step 1. The liking ratings were added in
step 2, and the motivation ratings were added in step 3. Significance Values: * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.001.
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Together, these results indicate that self-report ratings of
motivation provide unique predictive utility regarding task
performance across the experimental conditions, which suggests
that knowing the participant’s subjective motivational state
can explain a significant degree of intra- and inter-individual
variation in cognitive control task performance (See Figure 3A).
Critically, when we removed the nine NR subjects from the
dataset, these self-report ratings still significantly predicted
reward rate over and above experimental task conditions. This
indicates that the effects were not due to any potential anomalies
(or skewed) rating profiles present in these participants.
Furthermore, since motivation ratings appeared to account
for unique variance over and above the liking ratings, it is
possible that self-reported motivation and liking may tap into
distinct psychological constructs that contribute to motivational
state, such as incentive salience and hedonic value, respectively
(Finlayson et al., 2007; Dai et al., 2010).
Moreover, these self-report results suggest that subjective
motivational state is induced, but not completely determined,
by experimental manipulations. This finding let us to conduct
a second experiment, which aimed to elucidate whether the
motivational state induced by monetary and liquid incentives
reflects idiosyncratic subjective preferences or rather, just the
categorical meaning denoted by the different liquid feedback
conditions (i.e., the intrinsic properties of the liquids themselves
as indicators of positive, neutral, and negative valence).
EXPERIMENT 2: DO SELF-REPORT
MOTIVATION RATINGS REFLECT THE
MOTIVATIONAL IMPACT OF LIQUID
INCENTIVES?
In experiment 1, the categories of liquid feedback were clearly
designated (e.g., juice is appetitive, saltwater is aversive). We ran
a second experiment with the same task paradigm, except using
only appetitive liquids (e.g., three juices) as feedback, in order
to decouple categorical meaning from subjective motivational
influence across the different liquid conditions. The purpose
of the second experiment was to determine whether self-
report motivation ratings still predicted unique variance in
task performance above and beyond the experimental reward
manipulations, as in the first experiment. If so, it would provide
strong evidence that these self-report ratings tap into a latent
motivational state that reflects the subjective impact of each
liquid (which is idiosyncratic), rather than any intrinsic (i.e.,
symbolic/categorical) property of the liquid incentive.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Thirty-nine adults (18 females; ages 18–25; M = 19.92; SD =
2.17) were recruited from theWashington University Psychology
Department Experimetrix Subject Pool. The study was carried
out in accordance with the recommendations of the Institutional
Review Board of the Human Research Protection Office at
Washington University, St. Louis. All participants provided
written informed consent, and were given a payment for their
participation ($25 for two separate sessions totaling 2.5 h), with
additional earnings based on performance up to 7 dollars (mean
= $4.90, SD = $0.70). One participant was excluded from
analyses due to experimental and/or technical error. Similar to
experiment 1, study data were collected and managed using
REDCap electronic data capture tools hosted at Washington
University (Harris et al., 2009).
Task
The task was identical to the first experiment, except that only
appetitive juices were used as liquid feedback (V8 Strawberry
Banana vegetable and fruit juice, V8 Tropical Orange vegetable
and fruit juice, and Welch’s Grape Juice) during the incentive
runs.
Procedure
We determined the subjects’ preferences for each of the three
juices in a separate 15-min session prior to the task session. First,
subjects participated in a preference-ranking procedure, in which
the subject was presented with a choice between two of the four
liquids in a single trial (three juices and one isotonic neutral
solution), and asked to choose which liquid they preferred. Each
possible combination of liquids was presented, and preference
rankings were derived. Next, subjects tasted each of the four
liquids in a random order and asked to evaluate each liquid
based on its pleasantness, on a Likert scale ranging from −10
to 10. Subjects also filled out the Behavioral Inhibition/Approach
System survey (Carver andWhite, 1994), the Generalized Reward
and Punishment Expectancy Scale (Ball and Zuckerman, 1990),
and the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins and Friedman,
2001) as self-report measures of reward-related personality traits.
During the second session (on a separate day), participants
performed the same letter-digit switching paradigm as in
Experiment 1. They were explicitly asked to not eat or drink
anything except water for 2 h prior to the start of the experiment.
First, they performed three practice runs of the letter-digit task-
switching paradigm, where they received performance feedback
after each trial. Next, they performed three longer baseline
runs, where they no longer received any performance feedback.
During the task-switching baseline run of 96 trials, participants
performed with an average response time of 834ms (SD =
179ms) and 92% accuracy (SD = 0.07). As in Experiment 1, the
dollar signs were present with the task cue, but they did not hold
any significance in the practice or baseline runs.
Next, the participants performed three runs of mixed letter-
digit task in the incentive condition. The juice identity was
blocked and counterbalanced across subjects. With the exception
of the liquids used as feedback, the task procedure was identical
to Experiment 1.
Participants filled out various questionnaires upon completion
of the task, which included ratings that asked on a 7-point Likert
scale how much they liked and how intense they found each of
the three juices. They rated their motivation for performing each
the low, medium, and high reward trials on each of the three
liquid conditions on a 7-point scale. Lastly, they evaluated each
liquid based on its pleasantness again on a Likert scale from −10
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FIGURE 3 | Relationship between Motivation Ratings and Reward Rate. (A) The scatterplot illustrates self-report motivation ratings from Experiment 1, divided
by liquid feedback type, and expressed as normalized residuals (i.e., controlling for individual differences in mean rating). Each plot contains three measures (for low,
medium, and high reward) for each subject. A wider spread of residuals was observed during the saltwater condition compared to the neutral and juice. (B) The
scatterplot illustrates the normalized residuals of the motivation ratings from Experiment 2, separated by juice identity. Each plot contains three measures (for low,
medium, and high reward) for each subject. Unlike the residuals in Experiment 1, there is not a clear difference in spread across the different liquid conditions.
to 10. Following completion of the questionnaires, participants
were informed of their additional earnings, paid and debriefed.
Results
Juice Preference Patterns
First, we examined juice preference patterns, which were derived
from the preference-ranking procedure. Only 22 of the 39 total
subjects demonstrated consistent (i.e., transitive) preferences.
Within this subset, eight preferred grape juice as their top choice,
while 10 preferred tropical orange, and one preferred strawberry
banana. A 3 × 1 repeated measures ANOVA revealed that
preference rank was not a significant predictor of reward rate
[F(2, 42) = 1.438, p = 0.248]. We ran a 3 × 1 repeated measures
ANOVA on liking ratings with juice identity as a factor, and
found no significant differences in liking ratings across different
juice identities [F(2, 74) = 1.835, p = 0.167]. Since the contrast
between the liquids was less stark compared to Experiment 1,
we suspected that participants tended to like all of the juices
relatively equally, and may not have had strong preferences
between them. This is clearly reflected in the juice Likert ratings
(range 1–7), which demonstrate that individuals generally gave
the juices similar ratings (Mgrape = 4.45, Morange = 4.54,
Mstrawberry = 3.95). When we more closely examined the rank-
preference data, we found that 2 subjects preferred the neutral
solution to all the juices, which is surprising since the juices are
typically treated as appetitive incentives. Given the high rate of
intransitive and inconsistent ratings, we chose not to include
preference rankings in our primary analyses. However, while the
rank preferences may not have been fine grained enough to detect
juice preferences, we suspected that the self-report motivation
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ratings may have been more sensitive to the subtle influences of
the juices in motivating cognitive task performance.
Monetary Reward Influences Task
Performance
Next, we looked at reward rates, separated by monetary reward
amount (low, medium, high) and juice identity (e.g., grape,
strawberry, or orange). A 3 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA on
reward rate with monetary reward and juice identity as factors
revealed a significant effect of monetary reward amount on
reward rate [F(2, 74) = 27.407, p < 0.001], indicating the reward
rate monotonically increased with monetary reward magnitude.
Juice identity did not have a significant effect on reward rate
[F(2, 74) = 1.397, p = 0.254], and there was no significant
interaction [F(4, 148) = 0.332, p = 0.865]. Performance profiles
across task conditions are summarized in Table 3.
Monetary Reward Influences Switch Costs
Based on the results from Experiment 1, we also tested switch cost
effects and their modulation by monetary and liquid incentives.
Consistent with the Experiment 1 results, a small, but significant,
switch cost was present when we collapsed all task conditions
within each subject [M = 19ms, t(37) = 5.038, p < 0.001].
A linear mixed-effects model on RT switch costs again yielded a
main effect of monetary reward [F(1, 342) = 11.213, β = −8.041,
p < 0.001], but no liquid effect or its interaction. Again, switch
costs were lowest in the condition with the highest monetary
reward [$: M1 =21ms, SD1 = 70ms; $$: M2 = 31ms,
SD2 = 82ms; $$$$:M4 = 4ms, SD4 = 73ms].
Motivation Ratings Predict Unique
Variance for Appetitive Liquids
We conducted a hierarchical multiple regression to test whether
self-report motivation ratings had predictive utility on reward
rate performance beyond experimental task manipulations
(similar to Experiment 1). The analyses were conducted using
lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) and LME4 (Bates et al., 2015)
packages in the R statistical language. We used a linear mixed
model with reward rate predicted by monetary reward m and
juice identity j, with beta weights for money, juice identity, and
the interaction (Equation 1). Monetary rewarded was dummy
coded ($ = −1, $$ = 0, $$$$ = 1), and the juice identity was
effects coded (contrast 1 = grape vs. orange, contrast 2 = grape
vs. strawberry). We conducted a mixed level regression with
monetary reward and juice identity as fixed effects, subject as
a random effect, and correlated intercepts and slopes for the
fixed factors. Unsurprisingly, we observed a significant effect of
monetary reward on reward rate, but no effect for juice identity.
Reward Rate = βm m+ βj j+ βmj mj (4)
Next, we added motivation ratings (e.g., How motivated were
you on the $ trial with Juice 1?) to the mixed model, which
were mean-centered by subject. Reward rate performance was
significantly predicted by motivation ratings when included as
the only predictor [F(1, 37) = 33.277, p < 0.001]. Moreover,
when we added the motivation ratings to the model that included
money and juice predictors (Equation 2), we still found that the
motivation ratings predicted additional variation in reward rate
[χ2
(1)
= 20.566, p < 0.001]. The betas and t values are shown in
Table 4.
Reward Rate = βm m+ βj j+ βmj mj+ βmotmotive (5)
Similar to Experiment 1, the motivation ratings significantly
predicted performance above reward effects in the task (see
Figure 3B). Notably the effect of monetary reward was weaker,
but still significant when the motivation ratings were added,
indicating that these ratings explained a large portion of the
task variance. Critically, since all three liquids were juices (i.e.,
there was no categorical distinction between the incentives), these
ratings likely reflect the subjective utility assigned to the task
condition, which is idiosyncratic and unrelated to the intrinsic,
TABLE 3 | Reward Rate, Error Rates, and Response Times (Experiment 2).
L
iq
u
id
fe
e
d
b
a
c
k
Monetary reward
Low ($) Medium ($$) High ($$$$)
Orange Reward rate 0.661 (0.131) 0.687 (0.121) 0.750 (0.096)
Response time 566 (43) 567 (65) 581 (55)
Error rate 0.169 (0.063) 0.150 (0.066) 0.157 (0.071)
Strawberry Reward rate 0.648 (0.132) 0.678 (0.081) 0.788 (0.096)
Response time 589 (82) 568 (50) 551 (48)
Error rate 0.182 (0.081) 0.163 (0.062) 0.146 (0.059)
Grape Reward rate 0.668 (0.101) 0.711 (0.102) 0.788 (0.093)
Response time 588 (66) 562 (51) 558 (69)
Error rate 0.178 (0.081) 0.160 (0.069) 0.121 (0.064)
Table of reward rates, response times, and error rates by experimental condition (three levels of monetary reward and three types of juice feedback). The mean score per experimental
category is listed, with standard deviation in parentheses. Reward rate is the percentage of incentive trials for which monetary incentive was received. Subjects received a monetary
reward during a trial if they were both accurate and faster than a reward criterion, which was established based on performance from the mixed baseline run. Response time includes
only correctly responded trials, in milliseconds. Error rate is the percentage of commission errors (i.e., excluding no response trials).
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TABLE 4 | Hierarchical linear regression of motivation ratings in
Experiment 2.
Variable β t AIC BIC
Step 1 −456.7 −359.1
Money 0.0516*** 5.291
Juice Identity
C1: Orange-Grape 0.0186 −1.214
C2: Strawberry-Grape 0.0189 −1.340
Money × C1 0.0173 −0.801
Money × C2 0.0137 −0.489
Step 2 −471.9 −363.0
Money 0.0289* 2.559
Juice Identity
C1: Orange-Grape −0.0124 −0.733
C2: Strawberry-Grape −0.0244 −1.335
Money × C1 −0.0148 −0.869
Money × C2 −.0072 −0.525
Motivation 0.0324*** 5.025
Results of a two-step hierarchical regression are presented, which tested whether the
self-report motivation ratings demonstrated predictive utility above experimental task
conditions, when three liquids with the same valence (appetitive) were used. A mixed
linear model was employed, using the lmer Test and LME4 packages in the R statistical
language, with reward rate predicted by monetary reward (dummy coded) and juice
identity (contrast coded) in step 1. Motivation ratings were added at step 2. Significance
Values: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.001, ***p < 0.001.
categorical properties of the liquids themselves. Furthermore,
these data provide strong evidence for the motivational impact
of liquid incentives on task performance, which informs our
understanding of how latent motivational states are explicitly
linked to cognitive processing.
Personality Measures and Task
Performance
Next, we tested whether individual difference personality
measures predicted reward rate. We utilized linear regression
statistical models to test whether individual differences between
personality measures contributed to additional variance in
reward rate. All personality measures were grand mean centered.
None of these personality measures significantly predicted task
performance (all p’s > 0.2).
Satiation Effects: Evidence of Outcome
Devaluation?
Since participants received appetitive liquid on every rewarded
trial in the experiment, it is possible that satiation may have
been a factor influencing cognitive task performance. If present,
satiation would predict reduced benefits of receiving juice as
liquid feedback in later trials in the experiment (when satiation
should be higher). To test putative satiation effects, we used a
mixed effects logistic regression with the LME4 package (Bates
et al., 2015) in the R statistical language, since this approach
enables greater flexibility in modeling effects of experimental
factors on a trial-by-trial basis. Our logistic regression modeled
whether the log of the odds of a trial being rewarded (1 =
yes, 0 = no) was predicted by monetary reward and trial order
across the entire session (trials 1–288). Monetary reward was
dummy coded, as in previous linear mixed models. We observed
a significant negative effect of trial order [β = −0.0009, z = −
3.238, p = 0.001] on the likelihood of reward attainment, such
that later trials were significantly less likely to be rewarded.
We replicated the same analysis for Experiment 1, but here we
found no significant trial order effect. While our interpretation
of these trial order effects are only speculative, they are consistent
with the hypothesis that increased satiation drove participant to
devalue the subjective value of the juice progressively throughout
the experiment. Such effects would not be predicted to be as
strong in the first experiment, given the strong categorical and
valence-related differences between the liquid types. However,
since these are post-hoc analyses, further study is warranted to
more systematically manipulate and test for satiation influences
on task performance.
DISCUSSION
Understanding how diverse types of incentives impact
motivation and behavior is important, as there is much
ecological validity of incentive integration in the real world.
This question is particularly relevant to understanding daily
decision-making or mechanisms underlying eating disorders
and affective-motivation disorders, such as apathy and anergia
(Kringelbach and Radcliffe, 2005; Berridge, 2009; Stice et al.,
2009). Our novel paradigm provides increased experimental and
interpretational leverage, by providing a clear-cut measure of
how the motivational impact of primary liquid incentives can
modulate monetary reward effects on cognitive performance.
In particular, this paradigm provides a novel means of less-
obtrusively incorporating primary incentives into experimental
designs, which has great utility for further investigating the
modulatory effects of a wide range of motivational manipulations
on decision-making and task behaviors. Next, we discuss some of
the key implications and interpretations of our primary findings.
Integration Effects of Reward Incentives
on Cognitive Task Performance
The results provide a clear-cut answer to our first scientific
question: individuals do integrate primary and secondary
rewards to modulate motivational and cognitive processes, as
evidenced by the additive effect of the appetitive incentives on
reward rate (i.e., juice feedback increased reward rate). When
we parsed reward rate into its subcomponents (RT and error
rates) in Experiment 1, we found that subjects performed faster
when they earned more monetary rewards and received juice
as liquid feedback, but did not commit more errors across task
conditions. In other words, the rewards systematically modulated
RT, but not via a speed-accuracy tradeoff. On the other hand,
the fact that incentives did not reduce error rates may seem
surprising, but it is possible that the lack of feedback on trials
that were not accurate or fast enough may have decreased
the salience of commission errors in juice blocks. Under such
no-feedback conditions, it appears that the primary impact of
incentives is that of increasing response vigor. This response vigor
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effect could reflect a direct impact of motivational influences
on behavioral responses (Talmi et al., 2008). According to
the Pavlovian-Instrumental Transfer account, appetitive rewards
can induce a generalized approach-related motivational state,
which exerts a concomitant influence on goal-directed action
selection. Such approach-related states are associated with a host
of motivationally-driven and species specific behaviors, of which
increased response vigor is a well-established phenomenon (Niv
et al., 2006). There is some evidence that these motivational states
may arise from increased tonic levels of the neurotransmitter
dopamine (DA; Niv et al., 2007; Beeler et al., 2010; Beierholm
et al., 2013). This tonic feature of DA is crucial, as motivation
often needs to be sustained over a long period of time during goal
pursuit (e.g., going to the gym to exercise and lose weight). Thus,
DA may play a key role in translating the motivational value
of rewarding incentives to enhance cognitive function, when
pursuing temporally-extended behavioral goals. However, this
relationship remains to be elucidated, and cannot be answered
within the scope of this study.
Integration Effects of Aversive Incentives
on Cognitive Task Performance
Addressing our second scientific question, aversive primary
incentives appeared to have a distinct effect from that of
primary rewards on cognitive task behavior. Specifically, aversive
incentives exerted an inhibitory effect on behavior, in which
participants produced increased error rates in addition to slower
RTs during the saltwater block in Experiment 1. Some researchers
argue that aversely motivated behavioral inhibition (curtailing
of ongoing actions in light of predictions of aversive outcomes)
is linked to increased levels of serotonin (5-HT; Dayan and
Huys, 2008; Crockett et al., 2012). However, the research on
processing aversive incentives is still sparse and relatively nascent,
so more work needs to be done to establish a putative neural
mechanism that may underlie how aversive motivation impacts
cognition. Furthermore, one important distinction with the
current study is that aversivemotivation is traditionallymeasured
more instrumentally (i.e., a certain action needs to be correct/fast
enough in order to avoid a punishment). Contrasted with the
current manipulation in which participants received saltwater
when fast and accurate, it is possible that motivation to avoid
a punishing incentive may differ from motivation to endure
a punishing incentive to earn a reward. Recent evidence has
found distinct neural processing of the same incentive with
opposing actions (go vs. no-go), revealing an asymmetry between
the computations for actions and valence (Guitart-Masip et al.,
2011). Therefore, we predict that altering the structure of the
task to mimic more instrumental tasks (e.g., performing fast
and accurately to avoid saltwater feedback) would increase
reward rate, but reduce the interaction between monetary and
liquid incentives. However, this manipulation would need to be
empirically tested to examine whether the impact of aversive
motivation is modulated by how the aversive incentives are
delivered.
While initially it appears that appetitive and aversive
incentives have distinct impacts on cognitive processing (e.g.,
additive effect of juice, interactive effect of saltwater), the
discovery of the no-response subset of subjects (N = 9) revealed
that the interaction between saltwater and money may be driven
by individual differences. Within this subset of nine subjects,
the disutility of the saltwater appeared to be greater than the
positive utility of low monetary rewards, which drove them to
intermittently forgo the opportunity to earn a monetary reward
rather than risk receiving saltwater in those trials. One plausible
explanation is that these subjects might be especially reactive to
saltwater, or to punishments in general. This could have led to
the adoption of a more extreme behavioral inhibition strategy,
that of withholding responses altogether. A previous study had
found that participants with high punishment-sensitivity showed
an overall increase in RT in a cognitive control task after receiving
punishments (Braem et al., 2013a). However, while it is plausible
that this extreme impairment of task performance may have
been linked to punishment-sensitivity, we were unable to directly
test this hypothesis, since we did not administer any surveys
that measured reward and punishment sensitivity in Experiment
1. Taken together, these results suggest another dimension
to our second scientific question regarding the relationship
between appetitive and aversive incentives. Specifically, it seems
that aversive incentives, under certain conditions, can exert a
multiplicative impact (interaction effect) on cognitive processing,
and that the strength of this interaction may be modulated by
how reactive individuals are to aversive incentives. In particular,
a putative hypothesis is that this interactive pattern demonstrates
a qualitative shift in cognitive strategy, from approach to
avoidance-driven, when the net motivational reward value of the
trial shifts from positive to negative.
Neural Mechanisms Enabling Integration
Primary and Secondary Incentives
These results naturally raise the broader question of how the
brain integrates diverse types of incentives (e.g., combining
primary and secondary) to motivate cognitive processing and
behavior. While our study did not involve a direct examination
of neural data, the findings suggest that the present experimental
paradigm might also be a potentially productive one for
examining the issue of incentive integration in the brain. There
has been much dispute regarding whether and how incentives
are integrated into a motivational value signal that biases action
planning and decision-making. One promising hypothesis is that
individuals integrate the values of diverse rewards into an internal
“common currency,” which is used to facilitate comparisons
between future potential actions and/or rewards in order to
bias cognitive processing and subsequent decisions (e.g., choice
preference, task-oriented behavior; Levy and Glimcher, 2012).
Prior research has suggested that vmPFC, OFC, and VS serve
as potential “integration hubs,” as these brain regions have been
found to respond to both primary and secondary incentives
(Knutson et al., 2001; Montague and Berns, 2002; O’Doherty
et al., 2002; McClure et al., 2004; O’Doherty, 2007). Moreover,
there is some evidence that signals from these putative hubs
correlate with activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a brain
region central to higher-order cognitive processing (Hare et al.,
2009).
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When integrating incentives of opposing valence (e.g.,
conflicting motivations), we also predict attenuated activity
in the ACC, a brain region involved in monitoring neural
signals from conflicting sources in order to output a unified
signal that modulates cognitive control (Botvinick et al.,
2004; Engelmann et al., 2009). Additionally, some accounts
highlight the ACC as playing an important role in integrating
rewards and punishments in order to generate a “motivational”
or “energizing” signal that contributes to cognitive control
(Fujiwara et al., 2009). Others have argued that ACC plays
a critical role as a computational substrate involved in value
integration (Plassmann et al., 2010; Park et al., 2011). From
this, we speculate that ACC may play a central role in
integrating incentives with conflicting valence to modulate
cognitive processing of task goals, but whether this integration
extends to situations involving different categories of incentive
has not yet been empirically tested.
We argue that investigating neural mechanisms can inform
the cognitive processes that underlie incentive integration and
cognitive control, and provide insight to patterns in observed
task-oriented behavior. However, these questions of incentive
integration andmotivated cognitive control are still in its nascent
stages of development, and need to be further explored in
experimental work, in order to garner a more sophisticated
understanding of motivation-cognition interactions.
Motivation and Cognitive Control
It is intuitive to imagine that cognitive control and motivation
are two distinct but intertwined drives that bias decision-making.
Cognitive control refers to the processes involved in regulating
cognition and actions based on currently maintained goals,
while motivation (as we have operationalized it), modulates
the vigor of response with which one performs that action.
From this, it seems reasonable to conclude that motivational
influences should impact the regulation of cognition and actions,
while an individual is maintaining a single or multiple goal(s).
Task performance is generally slower and more error-prone on
task-switching blocks relative to single-task blocks (i.e., mixing
costs), and on task-switch trials relative to task-repeat trials
(i.e., switch costs; Monsell, 2003). However, individuals are
also able to reduce their mixing and switch costs if they are
able to adequately prepare for the upcoming task. Motivational
incentives, on the other hand, can modulate cognitive control
by enhancing context-sensitivity to rewards, and by increasing
flexibility in response times (Aarts et al., 2011; Shen and Chun,
2011; Kleinsorge and Rinkenauer, 2012; Braem et al., 2013b; Bugg
and Braver, 2015).
Consistent with these prior findings, we observed (in both
experiments) that switch costs were significantly reduced when
monetary rewards were highest. On the other hand, liquid
incentives did not produce anymodulation of switch costs, which
may seem surprising given their effects on overall reward rate
and general task performance (RT and error rates; Experiment 1).
Nevertheless, even for monetary rewards the obtained patterns
were fairly subtle and switch costs levels were low overall. The
subtle pattern of observed switch cost effects was not overly
surprising, given that high switch costs are thought to reflect
suboptimal preparation for the upcoming task, and in the current
experiment ample preparation time was provided (1800ms cue-
to-target interval). For the purposes of our study, we assumed
that reward rate improvements were due to enhanced cognitive
control, but this may not have been reflected in terms of a strong
modulation of switch costs. It is possible that rewards may have
more strongly modulated mixing costs, but we cannot confirm
this since the paradigm was not designed to measure mixing
costs (i.e., we did not include single-task conditions). In short,
our task design was not optimized for isolating reward effects on
cognitive control, as we did not explicitly manipulate switch costs
or mixing costs. However, this is a possible future direction in
follow up studies, such as by manipulating preparation time or by
comparing with incentive effects observed in single task blocks.
Incentives Modulate Motivational State to
Bias Cognitive Task Performance
Addressing our third scientific question, one of the most
promising results of this study was the finding that self-
reported motivation ratings demonstrated utility in predicting
task performance above and beyond experimental task
manipulations. Since our second experiment validated that
these ratings reflected subjective idiosyncratic preferences
rather than intrinsic properties of the liquids themselves (e.g.,
symbolic/categorical knowledge that juice is good, saltwater is
bad), we are confident that these ratings are truly motivational
in nature. For that reason, we believe that the current results
provide strong support that monetary and liquid incentives
are influencing cognitive task performance via a direct change
in motivational state. In other words, the observed incentive
effects cannot be fully explained by a simple shift in task strategy
in response to the symbolically-cued importance of each trial
(i.e., $ = low importance; $$$$ = high importance), since such
an account could neither explain the effects of liquid valence
in Experiment 1, nor the idiosyncratic patterns of motivation
ratings on task performance observed in both experiments.
However, one limitation of these self-report ratings is that
they were collected at the end of the study, so they might reflect
retrospective memory of motivation, as opposed to an on-line
estimate of motivational state during the task. While we are
confident that these ratings do reflect some level of motivation,
this potential confound cannot be easily circumvented, and
we acknowledge that the distinction between current and past
evaluation of motivation is difficult to determine with the current
measure. Despite the limited temporal resolution of these ratings,
our results suggest that participants appear to have explicit access
to their own motivational state, and can report this state in
a distinct manner from the subjective liking of the liquid or
available monetary rewards. These findings suggest the utility
of probing self-reported motivation in cognitive experiments, in
order to increase explanatory and predictive power regarding
associated behavioral performance effects, and likewise to
uncover the particular mechanisms that subserve such effects.
Both a potential limitation, but also an advantage, of using
consummatory incentives is that they have the potential to induce
satiation (a motivational state), which may incidentally cause
individuals to devalue the subjective utility of particular actions
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 14 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 2037
Yee et al. Humans Integrate Monetary and Liquid Incentives
or trials in a cognitive task. For example, a thirsty individual
might perform differently in this study compared to one that
had just drank a glass of water. This is particularly relevant to
Experiment 2, in which we found that participants performed
significantly worse (i.e., achieved lower reward rates) on later
trials of the task. These trial order effects may have reflected
increased satiation from earning too many juice rewards, which
was not a significant factor in Experiment 1. Nevertheless,
although satiation is a plausible account and potential confound
present in Experiment 2, more work would be needed to further
explore and understand its effects. On the other hand, the
possibility of satiation-related influences on motivation and task
performance could also be construed as an advantageous feature
of the task paradigm. Specifically, the presence of clear outcome
devaluation effects (e.g., in response to selective satiation)
has been traditionally used as a diagnostic signature of the
degree to which behavior is under goal-directed vs. habitual
control (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002; Niv et al., 2006). Thus,
stronger demonstrations of satiation related effects in the current
paradigm could provide insight to the specific (and potentially
distinct) mechanisms by which liquid and monetary incentives
influence motivational states to modulate cognitive processing.
CONCLUSION
Overall, our study provides an important first stage of evidence
regarding how humans integrate primary and secondary
incentives, while demonstrating that this integrated incentive
signal has a strong motivational impact on cognitive task
performance. The experimentally-induced motivational
state changes were robustly evidenced and indexed by the
predictive utility of the self-report motivational ratings, which
explained significant variance in the effects of experimental
task manipulations in both of the experiments. Taken together,
the findings highlight the productive utility of the novel task
paradigm we have developed here for investigating mechanisms
of motivation-cognition interaction. These can now be further
extended in studies utilizing neuroscience-based methods and
neural measures (e.g., fMRI and BOLD activation).
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